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The evolution of competition law in
East Asia
Ping Lin

INTRODUCTION
Competition laws promote economic efficiency and social welfare by
prohibiting restrictive business practices and creating a level playing field for
firms. More than eighty countries now have competition laws (Pitofsky 1998).
The Philippines was the first East Asian country to introduce a competition
law, under American rule in 1925. Japan’s Antimonopoly Law was passed in
1947, again under US occupation. It was not until the 1980s and 1990s that
most other regional countries enacted competition laws. This chapter surveys
the current state of competition policy in three East Asian economies – Japan,
China and Hong Kong. It looks at the effectiveness of these policies and how
well they are being enforced, and examines the lessons that can be learnt
from the experiences of these countries.
The effective deterrence of competition law violations requires that the
expected cost of violating the law be no lower than the illegal gain. The probability
that a violator will be caught will depend on the effectiveness of the enforcement
system, but will always be less than 1. This suggests that the penalty should
exceed the illegal profit, thereby justifying a punitive (or multiple damages)
system.
Japan made significant amendments to its 1947 Antimonopoly Law in the
1990s and is on the way to establishing a modern antitrust system. Although
enforcement has improved, the administrative surcharge, which is the major
mechanism for imposing sanctions, is still not consistent with the basic principle
of deterrence. Like many other Asian countries, China and Hong Kong are in
the early stages of developing an effective competition policy. China’s 1993
Unfair Competition Law is enforced primarily by local administrative agencies,
which are ineffective in combating violations by protected local interests. Hong
Kong’s laws are seemingly simpler, but its sectoral approach prevents enforcers
from appearing impartial and independent.
Competition policy has not had a great deal of domestic support in many
East Asian countries. Japan’s antimonopoly law was imposed by the Allied
Occupation after World War II, and it was pressure from the United States that
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drove the amendments of the 1990s. External factors played a similar role in
the passage of competition laws in Taiwan and Indonesia. In many East Asian
countries, competition policy will lose out if there is a conflict with other policy
objectives. Governments frequently intervene to promote certain industries or
firms (e.g., state-owned enterprises). It is difficult to establish a culture for fair
competition in such an environment.
The experience of other countries demonstrates the importance of an
independent enforcement agency. In East Asia this is easier said than done. In
Japan, for instance, the conflict between the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC),
which administers competition policy, and the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI), which implements industrial policy, has impeded the
enforcement of competition law (Sanekata and Wilks 1996). The most
challenging task for East Asian countries is to establish independent agencies
that are able to enforce competition laws.
EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COMPETITION LAW
Competition law is defined as a set of rules that govern the way that businesses
interact with each other in the marketplace. The Model Law on Competition
put forward by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) outlines the aim of competition policy:
To control or eliminate restrictive agreements or arrangements among
enterprises, or merger and acquisitions or abuse of dominant positions of
market power, which limit access to markets or otherwise unduly restrain
competition, adversely affecting domestic or international trade or economic
development. (UNCTAD 2000)
The Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) has published a set of
non-binding principles for guiding the development of a competition-driven
framework for APEC’s economies. These principles declare that:
the ultimate goal of this competition framework is to promote the process
of competition, as opposed to the welfare of individual competitors, in
order to achieve greater overall economic efficiency and an increased
average standard of living in domestic economies and the APEC region as a
whole. (PECC 1999: 6)
In some countries, including Japan and China, competition laws also meet
consumer protection objectives.
According to the Model Law on Competition, competition law covers three
main areas: restrictive agreements or arrangements, the abuse of market power,
and mergers and acquisitions. Unfair methods of competition are also prohibited
in some countries, including the United States, Japan and China. Table 2.1
summarises the state of competition policy in East Asia.
Competition laws vary in terms of their coverage and content, reflecting
differing social, political, cultural and legal contexts. Enforcement procedures
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Table 2.1

Competition laws in selected East Asian countries

Country

Title of law

China

Law of the People’s Republic of China
for Countering Unfair Competition
(Unfair Competition Law)
Price Law

1993
1998

Competition policy statement/sectorbased competition provisions

1998

Monopolies and Restrictive Trade
Practices Act

1969

Indonesia

Law on the Prohibition of Monopolistic
Practices and Unfair Business Competition

1999

Japan

Act concerning Prohibition of Private
Monopolisation and Maintenance of Fair
Trade (Antimonopoly Act)

1947

Antimonopoly Law

1925

Hong Kong
India

Philippines

17

Date of
enactment

Republic of Korea Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act

1980

Taiwan

Fair Trade Law

1991

Thailand

Price-Fixing and Antimonopoly Act
(renamed Trade Competition Act in 1999)

1979

also vary. To evaluate the effectiveness of competition law, it is useful to adopt
a framework developed in the law and economics literature that has contributed
significantly to the understanding of the economic incentives behind violations
of competition laws (e.g., Posner 1977; Becker 1968).
Most laws rely on sanctions and penalties to prevent violations. The expected
cost of violating the law is determined by the penalty imposed on those who
are caught and by the probability that a violation will be uncovered and
successively prosecuted: that is, the expected cost of violating the law = P (the
probability of being caught) χ L, will be specified in the national competition
law. Different penalties can be imposed, the remedies can be criminal as well
as civil, the size of the fine varies, and some countries allow multiple damages
or punish repeated offenders more severely.1 In the United States, for example,
violations of the Sherman Act can result in a fine of up to US$350,000,
imprisonment for up to three years, or both.
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The probability of detecting a violation, P, depends on the administrative
and legal power of the enforcement agency, the procedures it uses, the size of
its budget, and the qualifications and experience of law enforcement agents. It
also depends on the degree of independence the enforcement agency has to
launch investigations and make decisions. Another factor affecting P is whether
private cases can be brought before the court and how willing individuals and
companies are to pursue such cases. In the United States, the 1914 Clayton Act
allows anyone who has been injured by an antitrust violation to sue in a federal
court and pursue treble damages plus the cost of the lawsuit.2
Another important factor concerns the burden of proof in a competition
case. In the United States, the legality of a firm’s conduct can be assessed under
either the per se rule or the rule of reason, which are quite different principles.
Clearly anticompetitive activities such as price fixing and certain types of vertical
restrictions come under the per se rule and cannot be defended on other grounds
(e.g., efficiency reasons). Illegality is not as easily defined under the rule of
reason, which applies to horizontal mergers and monopolies, as the activity is
assessed according to the effect on the marketplace. The distinction between
the two rules lies principally in the burden of evidence each imposes on the
parties to the litigation. Under the per se rule, the plaintiff need only demonstrate
that the defendant engaged in proscribed conduct, whereas under the rule of
reason, a further argument must be made that the conduct hurt the plaintiff or
society.3
The effectiveness of enforcement also depends on the extent to which the
enforcement agency is able to act without being constrained or unduly influenced
by political forces that might have conflicting objectives. In the United States,
for example, the Department of Justice was the only agency to enforce the
Sherman Act until 1914, when the Federal Trade Commission Act stipulated
that responsibility should be shared with the Federal Trade Commission. This
was an attempt by Congress to reduce the influence of the president over the
enforcement of laws. To cite another example, the conflict between Japan’s
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, now the Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry (METI), and the Japan Fair Trade Commission has often
been blamed for the weak enforcement of antimonopoly law in Japan up until
the 1980s.
Given that corporate crimes are motivated by the desire for pecuniary gain,
and that the probability of getting caught is less than complete, it is clear that
the expected penalty must be greater than the illegal gains in order to deter
crimes. Simply taking away the illegal profits gained will not deter future antitrust
violations. The drafters of the US antitrust laws were aware of this simple principle,
and instituted treble damages, where plaintiffs can be awarded three times the
actual damages (plus legal fees).4 China’s Unfair Competition Law and Consumer
Protection Law also allow multiple damages.
The differing experiences of Japan, China and Hong Kong are discussed
below.

The evolution of competition law in East Asia

19

COMPETITION POLICY IN JAPAN
Powerful, family-owned industrial conglomerates dominated the Japanese
economy up until the end of World War II, when the Allied Occupation forces
undertook to break up Japanese industry in order to prevent the re-emergence
of militarism. One of the key reforms was the introduction of a competition law.

The Antimonopoly Act
At the centre of Japanese competition policy is the 1947 Act concerning
Prohibition of Private Monopolisation and Maintenance of Fair Trade, known as
the Antimonopoly Act. The declared objective of the Act, which was modelled
on US antitrust statutes, is ‘to promote free and fair competition, to stimulate
the creative initiative of entrepreneurs, to encourage business activities of
enterprises, to heighten the level of employment and people’s real income,
and thereby to promote the democratic and wholesome development of the
national economy as well as to assure the interests of consumers in general’
(section 1). Table 2.2 lists the main provisions of the Antimonopoly Act.

Table 2.2

Main provisions of Japan’s Antimonopoly Act

Section of the Act

Provision

Section 3
Section 6

Prohibits ‘unreasonable restraints of trade’ (cartels)
Prohibits international cooperation that results in unfair trade
practices or unreasonable restraints on competition
Imposes surcharges on price cartels
Prohibits collusion and conspiracy in trade associations
Prohibits the creation of ‘monopolistic situations’ in highly
concentrated markets
Limits cross-shareholdings and holding companies (revised in
1996)
Limits interlocking directorates and the dispatch of directors
to other companies
Sets market concentration limits on mergers and acquisitions
Requires implicit collusion and parallel price increases be
notified to the JFTC
Prohibits ‘unfair trade practices’; stipulates that these activities
are to be further specified in ‘JFTC Designations’
Defines exemptions for monopolies under intellectual
property right laws, special cooperatives and natural monopolies (section 21 abolished in 2000)
Defines exemptions for recession and rationalisation cartels
(revised in 1999)

Section 7(2)
Sections 8(1)–(3)
Section 8(4)
Section 9
Section 13
Section 15
Section 18(2)
Section 19
Sections 21–23

Section 24
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The Antimonopoly Act has three main pillars. First, it prohibits unreasonable
restraints of trade; that is, collusive activities that restrain trade. Second, it prohibits
the creation of monopolies through mergers, cross-shareholdings and interlocking
directorships. The third pillar of the Act prohibits unfair business practices,
including behaviour that closes competitors out of markets or rules that
discriminate against other firms. Six practices are highlighted as particularly
unfair business practices:5
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

unfairly discriminating against other firms;
dealing at unfair prices;
unfairly inducing or coercing customers away from a competitor;
dealing with another party on restrictive terms;
using bargaining power unreasonably when dealing with another party;
and
6) unfairly interfering with competitors in their transactions with third parties
or interfering in the internal affairs of a competitor.
The Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) was created under the Act to
implement competition law and was positioned as an extra-ministerial body of
the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications
(the commission is now under the Cabinet Office). Although the JFTC is modelled
on the US Federal Trade Commission, its commissioners are not independent,
but are appointed by the prime minister from the ranks of retired bureaucrats.
The key post of chairman is usually filled by the Ministry of Finance.6 The four
other posts are shared out among leading ministries: one from MITI, one from
the Ministry of Justice, and two from the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs or the JFTC itself. This opens up the possibility of conflicts of
interest, as the commissioners might consider the interests of their parent
ministries. It is widely believed that the relaxed application of antimonopoly
law in the banking and securities sectors reflects the dominance of the Finance
Ministry over the JFTC. Having said this, the commissioners are appointed for
five-year, renewable terms and therefore enjoy substantial immunity from shortterm political pressures. In addition, no more than three commissioners can be
from the same political party. Independent administrative agencies of this kind
were unknown before the creation of the JFTC.7
The JFTC can address anticompetitive business activities in four ways: through
preventive consultations, informal measures such as cautions and warnings,
formal recommendations and complaints, and criminal proceedings.8 Although
an investigation can be initiated by the JFTC, most investigations are held in
response to a report from the public (Schaede 2000: 113). Of the 1,007 cases
examined by the JFTC between 1947 and 1996, 78 per cent resulted in
recommendations, and most of these were immediately accepted by the
respondents (Schaede 2000: 117).
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As originally enacted the Antimonopoly Act was quite stringent. The provision
on monopolies in the original law (article 8) prohibits any ‘undue imbalance in
business powers’. An enterprise that has a market share exceeding a certain
threshold may automatically be considered to exhibit undue business power. In
contrast, US law has a greater focus on conduct, and companies that occupy a
large market share do not necessarily violate the law.9 The Antimonopoly Act
prohibited the ownership of shares in a competitor and stipulated that mergers
had to be approved by the JFTC.
The Antimonopoly Act has been amended several times, most substantially
in 1953, 1977 and in the 1990s. The 1953 amendments relaxed some of the
original restrictions, while later revisions generally strengthened the Act.
The first major revision in 1953 ended the prohibition of cartels and authorised
two types of cartels – depression cartels and rationalisation cartels – both of
which were subject to the approval of the JFTC. Depression cartels were
temporary arrangements designed to alleviate economic hardship caused by a
disequilibrium in supply and demand. Rationalisation cartels were deemed
necessary ‘for effecting an advancement of technology, an improvement in the
quality of goods, a reduction in costs, an increase in efficiency or any other
rationalisation of enterprises’ (Kaserman and Mayo 1995: 403).
The 1953 amendments deleted article 8 of the Antimonopoly Act (the article
was reinstated in a different form in 1977), made mergers and acquisitions
unlawful only when they substantially restrain competition, and allowed an
exemption for resale price maintenance of goods that fall under the category
of intellectual property.10
One aspect of the Antimonopoly Act was strengthened by the 1953
amendments, namely the control of unfair trade practices. The original prohibition
of ‘unfair methods of competition’ was widened to include ‘unfair business
practices’ that lessen competition, including practices such as tying arrangements,
exclusive dealing, price discrimination, resale price maintenance by enterprises
that are not competitors (e.g., manufacturers and their suppliers or manufacturers
and retailers). The aim was to control abuses of power by large enterprises able
to place pressure on smaller firms (Matsushita 1993).
The next changes to the Antimonopoly Act in 1977 considerably strengthened
Japan’s antimonopoly law. First, the JFTC was allowed to levy an administrative
surcharge on cartels of up to 1.5 per cent of their total sales during the period
in which the cartel operated. The surcharge system was introduced after the
first oil crisis as a response to consumer complaints about the number of cartels
being formed (Matsushita 1993). Second, the JFTC was able to compel structural
changes to correct a monopolistic situation and control an undue imbalance of
business power. Third, a price reporting system was introduced to deter tacit
collusion by businesses raising prices simultaneously.
Japan’s enforcement of its antimonopoly law has been poor, particularly
prior to the 1980s. According to The Economist, ‘the law itself has teeth in plenty;
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the problem is that its designated watchdog has been trained not to bite’ (The
Economist, 16 September 1989).11 The lack of enforcement of antimonopoly
law is often cited as one of the key traits of the Japanese government during
the postwar period (Porter et al. 2000, Chapter 2).
Industry policy played a crucial role in achieving Japan’s economic miracle
during the 1960s and 1970s, and was the prime reason for the government’s
lack of interest in enforcing the Antimonopoly Act. To enhance the
competitiveness of Japanese firms in international markets and catch up with
the more advanced economies, Japanese ministries, particularly the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry, encouraged measures that contradicted the
principle of fair competition. As noted by Caves and Uekusa (1976: 149):
The goals of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry have varied
over time in weight and composition, but some have recurred regularly
since the ministry’s founding in 1949. One has been to promote the
movement of resources to certain favoured industries … Another goal has
been to promote larger operations in certain industries – larger plants because
of an abiding faith in economies of scale, and larger firms in the belief that
… Japanese firms should be as large as their American competitors in order
to compete with them effectively. This goal has led at times to considerable
enthusiasm for mergers and restriction of new entry into industries of interest
to MITI.
The pursuit of industrial policy has affected both the content and enforcement
of Japan’s antimonopoly law. The introduction of depression and rationalisation
cartels was a prime tool of industrial policy during the 1960s and 1970s.12
According to Porter et al. (2000, Chapter 2), as many as 1,379 cartels were
allowed between 1953 and 1994.13 The extension of provisions governing
‘unfair methods of competition’ to cover ‘unfair business practices’ in the 1953
amendment was to a large extent intended to protect small suppliers (Matsushita
1993).
According to some scholars, ‘the Japanese government takes a more
pragmatic approach to antitrust enforcement, one that makes allowance for
national goals such as industrial catch-up’ (Okimoto 1989: 13). However, it is
fair to say that the government has given more weight to industrial policy than
to competition policy. Although the JFTC and MITI have negotiated over conflicts
between the two policies, ‘there are not many examples that can be cited in
which the JFTC has ordered MITI to make major changes in industrial policy in
order to conform to antitrust statutes’ (Okimoto 1989: 14).

Recent changes to Japan’s antitrust system
Japan’s antitrust system has undergone substantial changes since the early 1990s,
with the Antimonopoly Act being further strengthened and the power of the
JFTC being greatly enhanced. The changes were driven by two factors: trade
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disputes between Japan and the United States, and the drive for economic
reform through deregulation and increased competition in domestic markets.
In trade negotiations during the mid-1980s, the US government started to
raise allegations of anticompetitive practices by Japanese firms and trade
associations. The Structural Impediments Initiatives talks in 1989 resulted in
several Japanese commitments on competition law and policy, including
(Yamada 1997):

 increasing the number of JFTC investigators and boosting the commission’s
budget;

 having the JFTC take formal action against price-fixing cartels and bid
rigging;

 having the JFTC increase transparency by disclosing detailed information
on its cases;

 increasing the fines for violations; and
 having the JFTC publish a set of guidelines on prohibited distribution and
trade practices.
In 1995 the Japanese government embarked on a comprehensive
restructuring of the economy with the aim of ending the worst recession since
World War II. Deregulation has been taking place in important sectors such as
telecommunications, energy, transportation and financial services to boost
domestic competitiveness.
In June 1990 the JFTC announced it would pursue criminal charges against
cartels, bid rigging, boycotts and other serious violations likely to have a
widespread influence on consumers. It would also come down hard on repeat
offenders and firms or industries that did not abide by measures to eliminate
violations. The penalty that could be imposed on individuals participating in an
illegal cartel or a monopoly was set at up to three years in prison or a fine of up
to 5 million yen.14
In 1991 the surcharge on cartels was quadrupled to 6 per cent for industries
other than wholesale and retail businesses. In addition, the government has cut
the range of cartels allowable under the Antimonopoly Act and other laws.15 As
a result, the number of cartels fell from a peak of 1,079 cases at the end of
March 1966 to 15 cases under four laws at the end of April 2000.
In 2001 a system was introduced to allow those who have been injured
by unfair trade practices to file a lawsuit seeking injunctive relief. This
was a substantial improvement over the civil remedies allowed by the
Antimonopoly Act.
Another recent development has been the decline in administrative guidance
of firms’ investment decisions that was so prevalent in government–business
relations in Japan. Administrative guidance has been used by various ministries
to accomplish policy objectives. Under the 1995 Deregulation Promotion Plan,
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ministries must consult with the JFTC in advance of issuing administrative
guidance. In 1994 the JFTC made public its Antimonopoly Act Guidelines on
Administrative Guidance, which identified instances where guidance could lead
to anticompetitive activities.
During the 1990s, when many other ministries were being rationalised, the
JFTC expanded in size. By 2000 the JFTC had a staff of 564, up from 484 in
1992.16 Table 2.3 reviews the types of cases that the JFTC dealt with between
1995 and 2000, showing that its primary focus has been on bid rigging.

An evaluation of Japan’s competition policy
Japan’s competition law has been in place for over half a century. Prior to the
1990s, competition policy was subordinate to industrial policy. Cartels and
administrative guidance contradicted the principles of competition policy. Since
the early 1990s, Japan’s antimonopoly law has been significantly strengthened
and enforcement has improved. The law now has more clout and on the whole
is as comprehensive as competition law in any other country. The JFTC is now
more powerful, independent, visible and active.
However, there is an important aspect of the law that needs further revision.
As mentioned earlier, the primary mechanism for imposing sanctions under the
Antimonopoly Act is the surcharge system. Enterprises found to have engaged
in major restraints of trade such as cartels and bid riggings are fined a fixed rate
of 6 per cent of sales revenues for three years. The surcharge system was
never intended to be punitive: ‘it is regarded as a confiscation of excessive
profits rather than as a fine’ (Sanekata and Wilks 1996: 115). According to JFTC
Commissioner Shogo Itoda, the surcharge system ‘aims at forcing violators to
fork out undue profit from cartels or bid riggings, and achieving social justice
based on the crime-does-not-pay idea’ (Itoda 2000).
Before the 1991 amendment, the fine had been 1.5 per cent of the longterm average profit across sectors, which was 3 per cent, because of an
assumption that only half of an offending firm’s profit would have come from

Table 2.3

Court cases brought by the JFTC, 1995–2000

Type of violation

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Private monopolies
Bid rigging
Price cartels
Unfair trade practices
Other
Total

0
14
5
4
2
25

1
15
7
2
8
33

1
13
4
9
0
27

3
15
3
5
1
27

0
22
3
5
2
32

1
9
2
5
1
18

Source: JFTC Annual Reports, 1995–2000.
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illegal cartel activities. The rate was raised to 6 per cent in 1991, following the
finding that the actual profit was around 15–20 per cent of sales.17
The economic framework outlined earlier in this chapter illustrates that the
fine is still too low to deter violations of the law. Given that the probability of
detecting a violation, P, is less than 1, the fine should be greater (by a factor of
1/P) than the surplus profits accruing from illegal cartels. Anything less makes
breaking the law profitable even when firms are caught. A move to a punitive
system through an increase in the fine would make Japan’s competition policy
more consistent with this principle. If the profit rate of a cartel is in the range of
15–20 per cent against an average 3 per cent normal profit, then the fine
should be at least 12 per cent.18
Much can be learned from the Japanese experience, for instance by looking
at why enforcement has been ineffective. Before the 1990s the main problem
was that the JFTC had little power, which meant that competition policy was
placed behind national priorities such as industry policy. Today two main factors
inhibit the power of the JFTC and the Antimonopoly Act (Schaede 2000). The
first is a lack of public awareness of antitrust principles and of what the
Antimonopoly Act permits or prohibits, which means there is little impetus for
stricter enforcement. Second, in stark contrast to the United States, where the
possibility of large private damages is a major deterrent to antitrust violations,
private antitrust lawsuits are extremely rare in Japan. A total of 31,745 private
antitrust suits were brought in the United States between 1945 and 1988, but
only 18 such suits were filed in Japan in that period (Schaede 2000, Chapter 5).
The discrepancy can be explained by the high cost and low probability of
success of bringing such a lawsuit in Japan.19 The effectiveness of Japan’s
competition policy would be enhanced if private parties had stronger incentives
to report antitrust violations.20 There are further lessons for East Asian countries
from Japan’s experience of building an independent enforcement agency.
COMPETITION POLICY IN CHINA
China did not have a competition policy until the early 1980s, when it started
to move from central planning to a market economy. Under central planning
there was no role for competition and therefore no need for competition policy.
The decision to permit the development of the private sector created the
need for rules to govern competition between firms. Three main laws and
regulations deal with competition issues: the 1980 Regulations on Development
and Protection of Competition, the 1993 Unfair Competition Law and the 1998
Price Law. Other regulations exist at the sectoral and regional levels.
The State Council issued the Regulations on Development and Protection of
Competition on 17 October 1980. The regulations stipulate that:
in economic activities, with the exception of products managed exclusively
by state-designated departments and organisations, monopolisation or sole
proprietary management of other products are not allowed.
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The regulations are brief. Article 6 provides that:
Competition must be introduced by breaking down regional blockades and
departmental barriers. No locality or department is allowed to block the
market. No locality or department should impose any ban on the entry of
goods made in other places. Localities should ensure that raw materials can
be transferred out according to state plans and must not create any blockade.
Departments in charge of industry, transport, finance and trade must revise
any part or parts of their existing regulations and systems which impede
competition so as to facilitate competition.

The Unfair Competition Law
The 1993 Unfair Competition Law was China’s first competition law and was a
significant step toward preventing anticompetitive practices and establishing a
competition policy.21 It states that the aim of competition policy in China is to
‘safeguard the healthy development of the socialist market economy, encourage
and protect fair competition, stop acts of unfair competition and defend the
lawful rights and interests of operators and consumers’ (article 1).
A total of eleven business practices are outlawed. Article 9 prohibits false or
misleading advertising. It also extends liability for false advertising to advertising
agencies that are aware or should be aware of a seller’s misrepresentation.
Article 13 limits the use of prizes as a marketing strategy and states that the
drawing of prizes must be conducted honestly and that prizes must not exceed
5,000 yuan (about US$605). Article 8 prohibits the use of bribes, especially
kickbacks to buyers, in money or materials. Article 14 outlaws the fabrication or
spreading of false information intended to injure the reputation of a competitor.
Protection against trademark infringement is offered by article 5, which forbids
the copying of trademarks and certificates of quality and origin, and also the
use of similar brand identification, such as brand names, packaging or designs,
that might confuse consumers. A fine of between 100 per cent and 300 per
cent of the value of the illegal gains may be imposed. Criminal sanctions may
be imposed under China’s Trademark Law.
Article 10 protects trade secrets. Trade secrets refer to ‘technical information
and operational information not known to the public that is capable of bringing
economic benefits to the owners of the rights, that has practical applicability
and that the owners of the rights have taken measures to keep secret’. The law
imposes a fine of between 10,000 yuan and 200,000 yuan on those who obtain
such secrets illegally or who know or should know that trade secrets were
obtained illegally but nevertheless distribute such knowledge to third parties.
The remaining five prohibited acts can be classified as antitrust provisions.
Article 15 prohibits collusion in the tendering process (bid rigging).22 Violators
can be fined between 10,000 yuan and 200,000 yuan, depending on the
seriousness of the offence (article 27).
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Article 11 forbids predatory pricing. It provides that an operator should not
sell a product at a below-cost price for the purpose of driving out a competitor.23
The following circumstances do not represent unfair competition: (1) selling
fresh products; (2) disposing of overstocked products or products that are at or
past their expiry dates; (3) seasonal reductions of prices; and (4) selling products
at reduced prices to pay off debts, when lines of production change or when a
business closes.
Article 12 provides that ‘In selling a product, a business operator shall not
make a tie-in sale against the wish of the buyer or attach other unreasonable
conditions’. And article 6 states that ‘Public utility enterprises or other business
operators that have a legal monopolistic status shall not force others to buy the
goods or services of their designated business operators in order to exclude
other operators from competing fairly’. A violation of article 6 may attract a fine
of between 50,000 yuan and 200,000 yuan, as well as the confiscation of between
100 per cent and 300 per cent of the illegally acquired revenues (article 23).
Article 7 prohibits government officials from coercing people into buying
products from designated suppliers, as well as blockades of regional competition.
The article states:
A local government and its subordinate departments shall not abuse their
administrative power to force others to buy the goods of the operators
designated by them so as to restrict the lawful business activities of other
operators. A local government and its subordinate departments shall not
abuse their administrative power to restrict the entry of goods from other
parts of the country into the local market or the flow of local goods to
markets in other parts of the country.
The Unfair Competition Law is enforced by the State Administration for Industry
and Commerce (SAIC) and its branches at the provincial, city and county levels.
All branches have investigative powers and can issue corrective instructions
(including the suspension of business licences) and impose fines for violations
of the law.24 The law does not provide for criminal penalties except in cases of
trademark infringements (article 21) and bribes (article 22). Even the extremely
collusive behaviour of bid rigging does not trigger criminal penalties under the
1993 law, although it does under the Law of Public Tendering, which took
effect in January 2000.

The Price Law
The main objective of the Price Law, enacted on 1 May 1998, is to curb price
wars and predatory pricing in China’s consumer goods markets. The law is
enforced by the State Development and Reform Commission and local price
administration agencies.
The law prohibits the following unfair pricing practices: price fixing (article
14), predatory pricing, discrimination against business operators, spreading
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rumours of price hikes, attracting business through deceptive pricing, among
others. The Unfair Competition Law addressed predatory pricing but did not
define costs. The Price Law suggests that costs include production and operation
costs. The provision regarding discrimination against particular business operators
was designed to prevent monopolies from applying a price squeeze to drive
out competitors. The Unfair Competition Law contains similar provisions regarding
discrimination against particular business operations. Criminal penalties cannot
be imposed under the Price Law, but it allows for fines of up to five times the
illegal gains.

Regional and sectoral regulations
In addition to the national Unfair Competition Law, various provinces and major
cities have also passed laws and regulations to counter unfair competition. For
example, price fixing was first prohibited under regulations passed by Guangdong
province. Beijing enacted its own Unfair Competition Law in 1994, shortly after
the promulgation of the national law. By 2000 more than twenty provinces and
cities had enacted their own unfair competition laws or regulations (Kong 2001:
15). Some sectoral regulations, for instance the 2000 Telecommunications
Ordinance, have also incorporated competition provisions.

An evaluation of China’s competition policy
China’s competition policy regime has two major weaknesses: the lack of a
comprehensive antimonopoly law and pervasive regional protectionism resisting
the enforcement of competition law. Although the fines specified by the existing
laws are fairly steep, deterrence is hampered by the weak enforcement system.
China also needs to extend the coverage of laws and increase the probability
that violations will be detected and punished. Another problem is that public
awareness of competition laws is poor.
Table 2.4 describes the activities of the State Administration for Industry and
Commerce in enforcing the Unfair Competition Law during 1995–97. Although
the majority of cases dealt with infringements of trademarks or trade secrets,
SAIC has also been combating antitrust violations and bid rigging. A large number
of the antitrust cases were against public utilities. Most of the cases were dealt
with through administrative measures, with only a small number turned over to
the judicial system. This reflects the fact that competition law enforcement in
China is primarily carried out through administrative channels.
In 1994 Chinese officials announced their intention to supplement the Unfair
Competition Law with an antimonopoly law. Officials from SAIC and the State
Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) drafted the Antimonopoly Law Outline.
The outline has been revised several times since, often after suggestions from
organisations such as the OECD, the World Bank, UNCTAD and APEC, as well as
from countries that have antimonopoly laws (e.g., Germany, the United States,
Japan, South Korea and Australia). The 1999 version of the outline, for example,
covers the standard categories of business conduct (price discrimination, tying
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Competition cases concluded by China’s State Administration for
Industry and Commerce

Type of case

1995

Consumer protection/business dishonesty
711
Infringement of trademarks/trade secrets
4,361
Abuses of administrative power
22
Restrictions by public utilities
55
Predatory pricing
10
Tie-in sales
91
Bid rigging
16
Removing/concealing/destroying illegal assets
24
Other
n.a.
Number of cases
5,290
Value of cases (million yuan)
419.1
Penalty (million yuan)
36.8
Cases transferred to judicial system
35

1996

1997

2,160
8,856
38
102
59
42
23
108
n.a.
11,388
738.2
85.8
104

2,441
9,296
13
94
32
85
37
46
2,847
14,891
843.9
107.9
5

Note: n.a. means not available.
Source: State Administration for Industry and Commerce, China.

arrangements, exclusive dealing, predatory pricing, market division, collusion,
abuse of market power, etc.) and structural changes such as mergers and
acquisitions that might lessen competition.25 The outline also briefly spells out
how an enforcement agency should be established.
Perhaps unique to China is the inclusion of administrative monopolies in the
proposed law. Four types of administrative monopolies are defined: forced
transactions, regional monopolies, sectoral monopolies and compulsory
associations that restrict competition. Among them, regional and sectoral
monopolies are the most prevalent.
Regional monopolies exist under the protection of trade barriers erected by
provinces and regions. Local protectionism blocks the entry of goods and services
into the local market, or prevents raw materials or technology from being
exported to other regions. Sectoral monopolies are large, integrated enterprise
groups that also assume a regulatory role over a sector. The groups usually
have ties with government ministries or departments and receive preferential
treatment. As natural monopolies, public utilities also have characteristics typical
of administrative monopolies. Operators in sectors such as water, power, gas,
postal services, telecommunications, civil aviation and rail transport are sheltered
from competition laws and government regulations.
The outline has not yet come into law. The long delay has mainly been
because views differ on the introduction of an antimonopoly law.
One view is that the government should promote the formation of large
enterprise groups and focus on developing economies of scale, so as to enhance
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the international competitiveness of Chinese enterprises. The introduction of
an antimonopoly law would work against these goals.26
Another view supports the introduction of an antimonopoly law after firms
have attained greater economies of scale. For the immediate future it is more
important to oppose unfair competition such as cheating and vicious competition,
rather than control industrial structure. An antimonopoly law can be introduced
later.
To complement the Unfair Competition Law, China needs to develop an
antimonopoly law that broadly controls monopolistic behaviour and restraints
of trade that lessen competition. It may take some time before a consensus is
reached about the best time to introduce an antimonopoly law. As China starts
to fulfil its WTO commitments, and the dominance of the state-owned enterprises
in the economy declines, attitudes toward antitrust laws will change. The ongoing
deregulation of important industries such as telecommunications, transportation
and public utilities will speed up the process of building an effective
competition law.
Within the existing legal framework of competition law, perhaps the biggest
problem is that the current enforcement mechanism cannot effectively deal
with sectoral and regional monopolies. First, the leading agency dealing with
market power, SAIC, is an agency at the ministerial level directly under the
State Council. It is one of many government departments and does not have
the authority to monitor the anticompetitive acts of other ministries in the way
that Japan’s FTC oversees administrative guidance. In fact, several new laws in
recent years have weakened the enforcement power of SAIC. The 2000
Telecommunications Ordinance, for example, specifies that anticompetitive
acts within the telecommunications industry should be investigated by the Ministry
of Information Industry, a task that had previously been under SAIC’s jurisdiction.
Similarly, the agency now no longer has the authority to fight bid rigging. Under
the 1999 Public Tendering Law, various (unspecified) government agencies
now have this responsibility. These developments underscore the need to set
up a truly independent enforcement agency that has the power to implement
existing laws in a consistent and effective way.
Second, enforcement currently relies almost solely on local administrations
for industry and commerce at the provincial, city and county levels. However,
the prevalence of regional protectionism makes it difficult for law enforcers to
carry out their duties. Motivated by economic and political interests, local
governments often protect enterprises by putting up trade barriers, tilting the
playing field in favour of local firms, or putting pressure on law enforcers
investigating local firms. Since local governments appoint the heads of local
Administrations for Industry and Commerce, it is difficult for them to enforce
competition law independently and fairly. The existing enforcement system is
not well suited for combating regional monopolies.
Finally, a distinctive feature of Chinese law is the inclusion of strict penalties.
Fines under the Unfair Competition Law and the Price Law can be up to five
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times the illegal gains for price fixing and three times the illegal gains for
infringements of trademarks and refusals to follow instructions over other
violations.27 China has encouraged its citizens to report illegal acts. For example,
the State Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Finance
decided that individuals and groups reporting Price Law violations to the proper
enforcement agency would receive a reward of 10 per cent of whatever fine is
imposed. The reward can be higher for special cases but is generally no more
than 2,000 yuan (People’s Daily, 14 December 2001).
Although many in China are aware of the existence of competition laws,
they are unsure what the laws prohibit. In one recent case in 2000, the managers
of nine television manufacturing firms met to fix the prices of televisions.28
They did not seem to be aware that this action would violate the 1998 Price
Law. The meeting was held openly, with national media coverage, and the
prices were announced to the public. The managers defended their action by
saying that a collective decision was needed to end price wars in the industry.
Officers from the State Development and Reform Commission had to state
publicly that this was a breach of the Price Law.29
COMPETITION POLICY IN HONG KONG30
Hong Kong did not have a competition policy until 1998, when the government
issued a policy statement based on a series of studies made by the Hong Kong
Consumer Council (Consumer Council 1996).31 The objective of its competition
policy is ‘to enhance economic efficiency and the free flow of trade, thereby
also benefiting consumer welfare’.32
Instead of a competition law, the government has set up a sector-specific
competition policy framework. Horizontal restraints of trade and abuses of market
power that impair economic efficiency or free trade, or that are intended to
distort the operation of the market, were included in the policy statement. For
horizontal restraints, the following examples were given: price fixing; bid rigging,
market allocation schemes, sales and production quotas; joint boycotts; and
unfair or discriminatory standards among members of a trade or professional
body that intend to prevent newcomers from entering or contesting the market.
For abuses of market power, the following examples were listed: predatory
pricing; setting price minimums for retail products or services for which there
are no ready substitutes; and restricting the supply of products or services to
the purchase of other products or services or to the acceptance of certain
restrictions other than for the reasons of quality, safety, adequate service or
other justifiable purposes.
The determination of whether a practice is restrictive ‘must be made in the
light of the actual situation. The intended purpose and the effects of the practice
in question, and the relevant market or economic conditions, etc., must be all
taken into account.’33 Thus, the rule of reason, rather than the per se rule,
would be followed even for practices involving price fixing and bid rigging,
which are normally treated as per se illegal in most countries.34
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The government also followed a sectoral approach in its policy statement,
the essence of which is to identify anticompetitive behaviour and encourage
competition through administrative or legislative measures in each sector. Instead
of establishing an overall law for the entire economy, the government has
proposed setting different rules to govern competition in different sectors, with
the administration of these rules to be carried out by sector-specific agencies.
For example, the Telecommunications Ordinance and the Broadcasting Authority
Ordinance specify the principles to be followed in promoting competition in
the telecommunications industry and the broadcasting industry, respectively.
In addition, detailed competition provisions were incorporated in the contracts
between the government and each licence holder. The Telecommunications
Authority and the Broadcasting Authority enforce these provisions and issue
warnings or instructions if violations occur.
For less severe violations, the authority concerned might require a licensee
to cease the action prohibited by the rules, but serious violations may attract a
fine. Up until 2000 the maximum fine that the Telecommunications Authority
could impose for violations of competition provisions or breaches of a licence
was HK$20,000 for the first offence (approximately US$2,600), HK$50,000 for
the second offence and HK$100,000 for any subsequent offences. These fines
were raised to HK$200,000, HK$500,000 and HK$1,000,000 in early 2000
when the Telecommunications Ordinance was amended. The Telecommunications Authority can request the court to impose a penalty not exceeding
10 per cent of the turnover of the licensee over the period of the breach, or
HK$10 million, whichever is higher. For the broadcasting industry, the penalty
is an amount not exceeding 10 per cent of the licensee’s turnover over the
period of the breach, or HK$2 million, whichever is higher. It is possible that
the authorities may decide to suspend an operator’s licence.
The Telecommunications (Competition Provisions) Appeal Board was
established to hear appeals against the Telecommunications Authority’s decisions.
The appeal board’s decisions are final. A board has not yet been set up for the
broadcasting industry.
Table 2.5 lists the types of cases considered by the Telecommunications
Authority during 1998–2001. Although over half of the cases related to advertising
conduct, some important competition cases were considered over this period.
Most cases were resolved without a fine, including a price-fixing case in January
2000 that involved all six mobile service providers.35

An evaluation of Hong Kong’s competition policy
Hong Kong’s current competition policy framework is transparent. During the
three years since the establishment of its competition policy, the government,
particularly the Telecommunications Authority, has handled competition cases
in an open, transparent and timely manner.36 Although there have been some
controversies, the government seems to be satisfied with the current approach
to competition policy.
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Table 2.5

Competition cases completed by the Hong Kong Telecommunications
Authority
1997–98 1999

Price fixing
Predatory pricing
Mergers/acquisitions
Unauthorised discounting
Breach of advertising code
Exclusive dealing
Undue discrimination/unfair
Cross-subsidisation
Customer complaints
Operation without a licence
Other
Total

3

3

2000

2001
(Sept.)

Total

1
0
8
22
2

1
1
1
1
13
0

0
0
0
0
5
0

1
2
4
9
40
2

3
3
0
6
45

0
2
0
0
19

0
3
3
0
11

3
8
3
6
78

Source: Office of the Telecommunications Authority, Hong Kong.

Chen and Lin (2002) argue that there are two fundamental drawbacks with a
sectoral approach.37 First, a sectoral approach may hinder the efficient allocation
of resources across the economy. In choosing where to invest, private agents
not only follow price signals but also consider regulatory and institutional barriers.
Under a sectoral approach, rules will be interpreted and enforced differently by
different regulatory agencies. Varying institutional environments will therefore
imply different rates of return on investment, and this will affect the decisions
of private investors.
The second fundamental problem has to do with the dual roles performed
by government regulatory agencies under a sectoral approach. On the one
hand, as regulators of natural monopolies, they must fulfil their regulatory duties,
such as issuing and administrating business licences, and reviewing and
monitoring standards and prices. On the other hand, they hear complaints and
judge the behaviour of the firms they regulate. When the same agency has
dual responsibilities, it is difficult for outsiders to believe that decisions can be
made independently.
Such a conflict occurred in a recent telecommunications acquisition case
dealt with by the Telecommunications Authority. In 1997 Hong Kong Telecom
CSL Ltd was unsuccessful in obtaining a mobile service licence through a bidding
process, but was allowed to acquire the successful bidder, Pacific Link. The
Telecommunications Authority was criticised for having compromised the
regulatory environment by allowing the loser of the bidding process to buy
back a licence. The Authority had difficulty defending its position because it
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was unable to convince critics that it had acted fairly in granting the licences
and approving the acquisition. Similarly, it was not able to establish that its
approval of the transaction was independent of its ongoing negotiations with
Hong Kong Telecom (CSL’s parent) on the termination of Hong Kong Telecom’s
exclusive licensing contract in the international calls market. Since the government
had to compensate Hong Kong Telecom for early termination of its monopoly
status, questions were raised as to whether the Telecommunications Authority’s
approval of the acquisition of Pacific Link was part of a compensation package
for the early termination of the monopoly contract. Had an independent authority
approved the acquisition and the Telecommunications Authority been
responsible for making licence decisions only, this conflict would not have
arisen.
The criticisms of the Telecommunications Authority’s actions are not specific
to individual cases. Rather, they reflect the problems of a sectoral approach that
stems from the presence of asymmetric information, and will likely also arise in
other sectors.
Chen and Lin (2002) further argue that a comprehensive competition law
enforced by an independent competition authority would overcome these two
fundamental drawbacks and better promote competition in Hong Kong.
LESSONS FROM EAST ASIA
In many Asian countries, external pressure or even direct intervention from
foreign countries triggered the introduction of competition policy. Japan’s 1947
Antimonopoly Act was imposed by the Allied Occupation forces, and the
extensive changes of the 1990s were a response to pressure from the United
States. In Taiwan the threat of trade retaliation from the United States played a
decisive role in the passage of the Fair Trade Law in 1991 after nearly a decade
of deliberation and revisions (Liu and Chu 2002). Indonesia’s new competition
laws were a direct consequence of an International Monetary Fund program
designed to prevent the economy from falling into a financial crisis like the one
in 1998 (Pangestu et al. 2002). As the world economy becomes more integrated,
countries will be forced by both external and internal forces to establish rules
for fair competition. Although economic integration has helped promote
competition policy,38 domestic demand is a key prerequisite for establishing a
truly effective antitrust system. What are the main obstacles for developing an
effective competition policy in Asian countries? What lessons can be drawn
from the cases reviewed here for other countries in the region?
In East Asia competition policy is sometimes in conflict with other policy
objectives. Asian economies have a long history of heavy government
intervention through state enterprises or through administrative guidance of
the flow of resources into selected industries. In Japan in the 1970s and 1980s,
in the newly industrialised economies seeking to catch up with the industrialised
world, as well as in other economies in the region, the state has played a crucial
role in guiding development. The promotion of industrial policy has influenced
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industrial structures, increased concentration and market power, and helped
create a culture of reliance on the government. It would be naive to expect to
build an effective antitrust system in such an environment overnight.
Influences from government-supported enterprises may delay the introduction
of competition policy or affect the scope and enforcement of such policy. This
is illustrated by China’s failure to enact an antimonopoly law. In Korea the
state’s desire to protect and promote the country’s large conglomerates
(chaebols) has meant that enforcement of the 1980 Monopoly Regulation and
Fair Trade Act has focused on unfair practices rather than abuses of monopoly
power (Shin 2002). It is reasonable to predict that there will be widespread
resistance to the introduction of competition policy and to the development of
a culture for fair competition in the region (Round 2002).
There has been a concern among developing countries that competition
policy may adversely affect economic growth by imposing restrictions on the
size of domestic industries and by depriving the government of its regulatory
and discretionary power. Some hold the view that competition policy should
be implemented only after economic growth is achieved through industrial
policy.39
Japan’s success in creating a ‘miracle economy’ in the 1960s and 1970s
might lend support to the argument that industrial policy should come before
competition policy. However, the increasing integration of the world economy
has made it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a country to grow without
inflows of foreign capital and technology, and without liberalising its domestic
industries and opening up to trade with the rest of the world. Adopting
competition policy will help attract foreign investment, as well as promote
trade and competition in domestic markets. It seems clear that the only way to
achieve economic growth and the efficient allocation of resources is to utilise
the market system and competition process. Competition law is an indispensable
element of a modern market system, as it sets the rules of the game to create
a level playing field for competition.
The passing of competition law does not guarantee an effective competition
regime. A qualified, independent enforcement agency is crucial for the rigorous
and effective enforcement of competition policy, as the drafters of America’s
1914 Federal Trade Commission Act were aware.
The principle of independence has been emphasised repeatedly in East
Asia, but experiences in the region suggest that the action does not match the
rhetoric. In Japan the composition of the JFTC has been described as an
impediment to the enforcement of antimonopoly law (Sanekata and Wilks
1996: 124).
Thailand’s experience also underscores the importance of institution building.
The Thai Competition Commission is chaired by the Ministry of Commerce. In
two cases against large companies in 2000, the commission’s poor institutional
design was blamed for its inability to find the defendants guilty of violating the
1999 Trade Competition Act (Poapongsakorn 2002).40
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Finally, acting independently is different from being seen to act independently.
Hong Kong’s experience with assigning dual roles to sectoral regulatory agencies
indicates that problems with asymmetric information should be taken into account
when designing the enforcement agency. This suggests that the principle of
independence should be about building an enforcement agency that is willing,
has the capacity, and can be seen to act independently.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has highlighted some common difficulties that many East Asian
countries face in developing an effective competition policy. These include a
lack of domestic support for competition policy, conflict with other national
policies, particularly industry policy, the influence of state-supported
companies, weak enforcement, and poor institutional design. Given the history
of these countries, such obstacles are likely to continue to hinder the
development of competition policy in the near future. However, Japan’s
achievements in strengthening antimonopoly rules in the 1990s suggest that
competition policy can move at a much faster pace. As heavy government
intervention becomes less popular and countries become more integrated
with the world economy, they will find it in their best interests to set fair
rules of the game for competition. This should not be surprising, as good
competition laws are needed for the success of a market economy.
NOTES
The author thanks Gary Banks, Edward K.Y. Chen, Hugh Patrick, David Round,
Frank Wiebe and other participants of the Twenty-Eighth PAFTAD Conference for
their useful comments and suggestions.
1 Non-pecuniary penalties are not considered here.
2 For an analysis of the trends in private and public antitrust cases in the United
States, see Lin et al. (2000).
3 Different countries may adopt different rules regarding the same conduct. For
example, price fixing is considered per se illegal in the United States, and any
effort by cartel members to set prices jointly is sufficient to prove that they have
violated the law. This is so even when the cartel members did not implement
the agreement or the agreement had no adverse effect on consumers. In Japan,
however, the Japan Fair Trade Commission has to further prove that the cartel
members followed the agreed plan and that the conduct affected competition.
4 This system has been criticised for encouraging too many lawsuits.
5 These activities were outlined in JFTC Notification 11 of 1953 and JFTC Notification
15 of 1982.
6 In August 1996 Yasuchika Negoro became the first JFTC chair in thirty-three
years to come from outside the Ministry of Finance (MOF) or the Bank of
Japan. Since his appointment, the JFTC has introduced greater transparency
into its rules and systems.
7 The JFTC also implements the Act against Unjustifiable Premiums and Misleading
Representations and the Act against Delays in Payment of Subcontract
Proceeds, etc., to Subcontractors. These are special laws complementing the
Antimonopoly Act.
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A warning is a written guidance and is stronger than a caution. There does not
need to be a legal case for a warning, and no penalty will be imposed. If the
JFTC finds evidence of a substantial violation of the Antimonopoly Act, it can
issue a recommendation, which is usually accompanied by a cease-and-desist
order. The respondent must notify the JFTC within a certain period (usually ten
days) whether it accepts the recommendation. If the JFTC receives an acceptance,
it will close the case by issuing a final recommendation. There will be no
further investigation or criminal proceedings. If, however, the respondent denies
the alleged conduct and refuses to accept the recommendation, the case becomes
a complaint and a trial hearing will be held. If the respondent rejects the decision
of the hearing, he or she can appeal to the Tokyo High Court and, if necessary,
to the Supreme Court.
Japanese businesses were highly critical of article 8 as they saw economies of
scale as the way to revitalise the postwar economy.
Resale price maintenance occurs when upstream firms set vertical restrictions
on retail prices.
Shogo Itoda, Commissioner of the JFTC, rejected this claim, saying that ‘the
JFTC barks loudly and bites violators hard’ (Itoda 2000).
According to Iyori and Uesugi (1983: 19), ‘the major exemption laws were
enacted until 1952. The Stabilisation of Specific Small and Medium Enterprise
Temporary Measures Act, which authorised depression cartels for specific small
enterprises, and the Export Trading Act, which permitted export cartels, were
both enacted in that year. Since that time, many exemption laws intended to
prevent excessive competition between small enterprises or to promote
rationalisation were enacted, revised or strengthened almost every year … Many
exemption laws opened the door for approval of cartels not by the JFTC but
under the guidance of the ministries in charge of the industries. They also
provided for restrictions on the activities of non-members of cartels in order to
strengthen cartel activities.’
The Japanese government has not approved a recession cartel since 1989,
despite Japan being in recession for the entire 1990s.
The amendment of the Antimonopoly Act in May 2000 set the maximum penalty
that could be imposed on companies at 500 million yen, up from the previous
maximum of 100 million yen. However, there are no criminal penalties for
unfair trade practices.
About thirty-five exemptions under twenty laws other than the Antimonopoly
Act and the Exemption Act were abolished or modified under the 1997 Omnibus
Act. The 1999 Omnibus Act put in place measures to repeal the depression
cartels and rationalisation cartels under the Antimonopoly Act, abolish the
Exemption Act, and limit the scope or establish JFTC procedures concerning six
exemptions under four other laws. Another amendment to the Antimonopoly
Act took effect in June 2000, repealing section 21 and thereby eliminating the
antimonopoly exemption for the electricity, gas and rail sectors, as well as other
sectors that could be characterised as natural monopolies.
In 1999 the Antitrust Division in the US Department of Justice had 819 staff, the
US Federal Trade Commission had 964 staff, and the Competition Directorate
General of the European Union had 486 staff (JFTC web site: http://www2.jftc.go.jp
/e-page/index.htm).
The US Trade Representative expected an increase to at least 10 per cent (Sanekata
and Wilks 1996).
Under the treble damages system, the fine would be 36 per cent.
When bringing cases under the Antimonopoly Act, the full burden of proof is
on the plaintiff, who must provide evidence of a causal relationship between
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the cartel and the injury suffered, and of the extent of damages incurred. Moreover,
with no allowance for double, treble or punitive damages, the incentive for
bringing a private lawsuit is low. Class action suits are now allowed in Japan,
but plaintiffs cannot pool litigation costs. In addition the likelihood of winning
a private antitrust case is small, as courts side with the defendant in most
instances.
Iyori (1986) argues that cultural differences lead Asian people to settle cases
privately rather than through the courts.
A version of the law in English can be found at <http://www.apeccp.org.tw/
doc/China.html>.
The Unfair Competition Law does not prohibit price cartels (price fixing), which
are per se illegal in almost all competition laws in other countries. The omission
was corrected in the 1998 Price Law.
The law, however, does not give a definition of costs.
No new agency was created to enforce the 1993 Unfair Competition Law. SAIC
is under the State Council and has a long tradition of protecting market order.
Its other duties include administration of business licences, registration of
trademarks and the enforcement of other laws such as the Trademark Law and
the Advertisement Law.
For a brief description of the outline, see Chen (2000).
For more on administrative monopolies, see Wang (1998) and Yang (2002).
The laws, however, do not provide for criminal penalties.
The nine producers (Konka, Skyworth, TCL, Rova, Hisense, Xoceco, Jinxing,
Panda and Westlake) collectively had more than 80 per cent of the Chinese
market. After several price wars, the manufacturers decided to fix television
prices and agreed that televisions sold at lower prices would be considered
poor quality. The alliance said that prices that were any lower would not allow
manufacturers to recoup their production costs (China Daily, 25 June 2000 and
11 August 2000). The case has not yet been considered formally by the
government.
In a similar case, the Chinese Automobile Industry Association stated in January
2000 that China’s ten car manufacturers had decided not to fight a price war by
lowering prices (China Daily, 3 August 2000).
This section is based on Chen and Lin (2002).
In October 1992 the Hong Kong Consumer Council launched a series of studies
on market competition in sectors such as banking, retailing, gas supply,
telecommunications, radio broadcasting and real estate. Low levels of competition
were found in most sectors. The November 1996 report on competition policy
in Hong Kong strongly recommended the adoption of a comprehensive
competition law and the establishment of an independent competition authority
(Consumer Council 1996).
See <http://www.info.gov.hk/tib/roles/psoc.htm>.
See <http://www.info.gov.hk/tib/roles/psoc.htm>.
According to the Secretary for Trade and Industry, Denise Yue Chung-yee,
firms can achieve economies of scale and provide better service under many
‘apparently collusive agreements’ and it ‘would not be proper to rule these out
indiscriminately’ (South China Morning Post, 4 November 1997).
This price cartel lasted for two weeks and the companies rescinded the
simultaneous price increases after receiving warning letters from the
Telecommunications Authority. In another incident, the dominant operator in
the international calls market was fined HK$50,000 for having repeatedly violated
the terms of its contract that prohibited it from offering unauthorised discounts
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to its customers. This is probably the heaviest fine levied so far in a competition
case in Hong Kong.
Since 1997 the Telecommunications Authority has handled over eighty-one
competition cases. For details, see Chen and Lin (2002).
The Consumer Council pointed out that the sectoral approach is piecemeal and
fails to provide consistent, comprehensive guidelines. It also stated that
competition provisions in different sectors may be subject to different
interpretations and carry different penalties, and that a sectoral approach may
be prone to the capture of regulators by interest groups. The government, on
the other hand, stated that it did not see the need to introduce a broad competition
law and that a sectoral approach is less expensive, less intrusive and can take
into account industry conditions and provide greater certainty to the business
community.
For a detailed discussion of the link between trade policy and competition
policy, see Wu and Chu (1998).
The promotion of economic development is one of the objectives of the UNCTAD
Model Law.
One of the companies serviced cable televisions and the other was in beer
manufacturing.
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